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Abstract 
 
This research aims to investigate the effect of controlling shareholders and the effectiveness of board 
of commissioners and audit committee on the audit quality measured by AQMS (Audit Quality Metric 
Score). This study uses companies listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange as the sample. The results 
of this research provide evidence that alignment and entrenchment effect of the controlling 
shareholders have positive effect on audit quality. The alignment of interests between the controlling 
and non-controlling shareholders cause the company to appoint a high-quality auditor. The results 
also show that when companies face high entrenchment effect of the controlling shareholders, they 
still appoint a high-quality auditor to reduce the agency conflict and to maintain the company’s 
reputation. This research also shows that the effectiveness of board of commissioners and audit 
committee positively affect the audit quality.  
 
Keywords: alignment and entrenchment effect, audit quality, controlling shareholders, board of 
commissioners, audit committee 
 
Abstrak 
 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh pemegang saham pengendali serta efektivitas dewan 
komisaris dan komite audit terhadap kualitas audit yang diukur dengan AQMS (Audit Quality Metric 
Score). Penelitian ini menggunakan perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia sebagai 
sampel. Hasil penelitian ini memberikan bukti bahwa efek alignment dan entrenchment dari 
pemegang saham pengendali berpengaruh positif terhadap kualitas audit. Penyelarasan kepentingan 
antara pemegang saham pengendali dan pemegang saham non-pengendali menyebabkan perusahaan 
menunjuk auditor yang berkualitas tinggi. Hasil penelitian juga menunjukkan bahwa ketika 
perusahaan menghadapi efek entrenchment yang tinggi dari pemegang saham pengendali, 
perusahaan tetap menunjuk auditor yang berkualitas tinggi untuk mengurangi konflik agensi dan 
untuk mempertahankan reputasi perusahaan. Penelitian ini juga menunjukkan bahwa efektivitas 
dewan komisaris dan komite audit berpengaruh positif terhadap kualitas audit. 
 
Kata kunci: efek alignment dan entrenchment, kualitas audit, pemegang saham pengendali, 
dewan komisaris, komite audit 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Coffee (2010) explained that agency 
problem between management and 
shareholders commonly arises in companies 
with dispersed ownership structure. The 
dispersed ownership on the hands of many 
shareholders discourages the shareholders to 
monitor performance and decision making of 
management so that the control of the company 
lies on the management’s hands (Coffee 2010). 
Companies with disperse ownership structure 
can usually be found in the common law 
countries with strong investor rights 
protection, such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada (LaPorta et al. 
1999). 
Unlike in the common law countries, in 
civil law countries with weak investor rights 
protection, the majority of companies tend to 
have ownership concentrated in the hands of a 
few shareholders. This is proven by Claessens 
et al. (2000) through their research on 2,980 
companies in Asia, including 132 Indonesian 
companies, which the results show that the 
ownership of public companies in Asia tends 
to concentrate in a family ownership. 
Claessens and Fan (2002) stated that 
when ownership structure is concentrated in a 
few shareholders, controlling shareholders 
would have the ability to determine the 
company’s direction and operation, which is 
commonly referred as entrenchment effect 
(Claessens and Fan 2002). The presence of the 
entrenchment effect, however, does not always 
result in an agency conflict in the company. 
The agency conflict between controlling 
and non-controlling shareholders occurs when 
the controlling shareholders, with the control 
they exert, use the discretion of the company 
according to their personal interests, and 
therefore could potentially harm the interests 
of the non-controlling shareholders (Claessens 
and Fan 2002). This phenomenon is also called 
negative entrenchment effect (Claessens and 
Fan 2002). 
                                                          
1 Pyramidal ownership mechanism is a mechanism in 
which the share ownership of a company affects share 
ownership of other companies, the process repeats 
several times until it forms a chain of company 
ownership (Claessens et al. 2000).  
The negative entrenchment effect 
potentially worsened when the company is 
controlled by ultimate controlling shareholders 
through a pyramidal ownership mechanism1 
(Claessens and Fan 2002). The pyramidal 
ownership mechanism enables the ultimate 
controlling shareholders to have the control 
rights2 far exceeding their cash flow rights3. 
This may motivate the ultimate controlling 
shareholders to expropriate the wealth of the 
company without bearing any high cost if there 
is a financial loss or a decline of the company’s 
value (Claessens et al. 2000). 
In the condition when control rights 
exceed cash flow rights, the ultimate 
controlling shareholders may be motivated to 
appoint a public accounting firm (PAF) with 
low audit quality in order to maintain the 
condition of asymmetric information with 
external parties, so that the chance that their 
expropriation is discovered becomes lower. 
Choi et al. (2007) proved in their research that 
the greater the difference between control 
rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate 
controlling shareholders, the higher the 
probability that the company would appoint a 
PAF with lower audit quality. 
On the other hand, the ultimate 
controlling shareholders may also be 
motivated to appoint a PAF with higher audit 
quality in order to raise the investors’ trust 
towards the quality of financial statements. Fan 
and Wong (2005) show that the higher 
difference between control rights and cash 
flow rights of the ultimate controlling 
shareholders in a company, the higher the 
probability the company chooses a PAF with 
higher audit quality. 
Furthermore, as the percentage of 
ownership of the controlling shareholders 
increases, the entrenchment effect will be 
reduced and replaced with alignment effect 
(Fan and Wong 2002). The decrease of the 
expropriation ability was due to the higher 
costs incurred by the controlling shareholders 
if the company suffers a loss or declining share 
2 Controlling right is voting right to participate in 
determining important discretions in the company.  
3 Cash flow right is financial claim of the shareholders 
to the company.  
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valuation (Claessens et al. 2002). The increase 
in ownership of the controlling shareholders in 
turn could trigger the controlling shareholders 
to increase the value of the company and align 
their interests with non-controlling 
shareholders. This effect is called alignment 
effect (Fan and Wong 2002). The alignment 
effect of controlling shareholders would 
motivate controlling shareholders to improve 
the quality of audit of financial statements that 
are expected to increase the value of investor 
confidence to the quality of the company’s 
financial statements. 
Motivation of ultimate controlling 
shareholders in choosing PAF may be affected 
by the role of Board of Commissioner (BOC) 
and audit committee. According to OECD 
(2004), the BOC has a role in “ensuring the 
integrity of the corporation’s accounting and 
financial reporting systems, including the 
independent audit, and that appropriate 
systems of control are in place, in particular, 
systems for risk management, financial and 
operational control, and compliance with the 
law and relevant standards”. Lin and Liu 
(2009) found that companies with appropriate 
size of BOC have positive effect on the 
selection among of the Top 10 auditors, 
because more members in the BOC improve 
the monitoring effectiveness. It can be 
concluded that the role of BOC has positive 
effect on audit quality. 
In addition, the audit committee also has 
a role in the auditor selection process. One of 
the audit committee’s roles is to recommend 
BOC regarding the appointment of a PAF 
based on considerations of independence, 
assignment scope, and audit costs (Regulation 
of the Bapepam-LK (now known as OJK 
(Otoritas Jasa Keuangan) or Financial Services 
Authority) Number KEP-643/BL/2012). Thus, 
it can be seen that the audit committee has the 
ability to improve the audit quality of the 
company’s financial statements. Such ability 
depends on the effectiveness of the audit 
committee itself. Abbott and Parker (2000) 
show that the higher the level of audit 
committee’s effectiveness, the higher the 
tendency of the company to select a PAF with 
higher audit quality. 
This research is important to be 
conducted in Indonesia because more than 
50% of companies in Indonesia have 
concentrated ownership structure (Claessens et 
al. 2000; Diyanty 2012). The pyramidal 
ownership mechanism enables the controlling 
shareholders to have control rights exceeding 
their cash flow rights. This research 
contributes the literature in several ways. First, 
this research tests the effect of ultimate family 
controlling shareholders on the appointment of 
auditor in the Indonesian context which has a 
high family concentrated ownership structure. 
Previous research only accounts for 
blockholders ownership, while we trace the 
ownership until the biggest ultimate 
controlling ownership of the companies. 
Second, this research tests the effect of the role 
of Board of Commissioners (BOC) and audit 
committee on the appointment of auditor, 
using a comprehensive measurement from 
Hermawan (2009). Third, this research uses 
more comprehensive measurement of audit 
quality that consist of several measurements 
which are the size of the PAF (Big 4 or non-
Big 4), the audit tenure, the auditor industry 
specialization, and the perspective of 
independence which is measured by the 
importance of the client to the auditor (client 
importance) and the availability and the 
accuracy of the going concern audit opinion (a 
proxy for audit failure). More comprehensive 
measurement of audit quality enables this 
research to test the effect of ultimate 
controlling shareholders and corporate 
governance mechanism on the audit quality in 
a more robust testing. 
According to above background, this 
research aims to investigate the effect of 
controlling shareholders through entrenchment 
and alignment effects on the audit quality 
measured by Audit Quality Metric Score 
which consists of auditor size, the audit tenure, 
the auditor industry specialization, client 
importance, and the going concern audit 
opinion. This research also aims to investigate 
the effect of the role of board of commissioners 
(BOC) and audit committee on audit quality. 
This research expands previous researches by 
measuring audit quality by the degree of 
competence, industry specialization and audit 
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tenure, and also, independence (Herusetya 
2012). To examine the alignment and 
entrenchment effect of ultimate controlling 
shareholders, this research will trace the chain 
of companies’ ownerships to the ultimate 
controlling shareholders. The ultimate 
controlling shareholders are shareholders, 
individual or family group, government or 
foreign companies, with the highest control 
rights at the chain of company’s ownership. 
The tracing method of the ownership chain 
refer to research by Diyanty (2012), if there are 
more than one controlling shareholders from 
the same family, the total ownership would be 
the total ownership of the family. 
The measurement of audit quality is 
based on the degree of competence, industry 
specialization and audit tenure, and 
independence (Herusetya 2012). The 
measurement of the role of BOC and audit 
committee is based on independence, 
competence, audit activity and the size of the 
audit committee (Hermawan 2009).  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Ownership Structure and Agency Conflict 
In a dispersed ownership structure, 
agency conflict commonly occurs as a 
consequence of management’s discretions that 
are not in accordance with shareholders’ 
interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In 
concentrated ownership structure, agency 
conflict commonly occurred between 
controlling shareholders and management with 
non-controlling shareholders. This is because 
the controlling shareholders may control the 
management, so that management’s 
discretions are frequently used to gain the 
benefits for the controlling shareholders and 
neglect the rights of the non-controlling 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983; LaPorta 
et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2000; Diyanty 
2012). With higher control rights, the 
controlling shareholders could control 
discretions, both in direction and strategic 
decision making of the company. This 
condition is also known as entrenchment effect 
(Coffee 2010). 
Entrenchment effect potentially worsens 
in the companies that have pyramidal 
ownership structure. Pyramidal ownership 
structure allows controlling shareholders to 
have control rights higher than cash flow 
rights. Accordingly, controlling shareholders 
could freely undertake activities regardless the 
non-controlling shareholders’ interests without 
bearing any high costs in the event of loss or 
declining company’s value (Claessens et al. 
2000). 
On the other hand, according to Fan and 
Wong (2002), the increase in the ownership 
could reduce the expropriation ability of the 
controlling shareholders and also encourage 
them to increase the company’s value, which 
is called as the alignment effect. This is 
because controlling shareholders bear the risk 
bear a greater risk for the failure of the 
company (Fan and Wong 2002). The higher 
risks would lead the controlling shareholders 
lower the expropriation actions and maintain 
the company’s credibility by increasing 
management monitoring (Claessens et al. 
2002). 
 
Audit Quality 
Audit quality is a complex and 
multidimensional concept (Herusetya 2012). 
The perception of audit quality is different 
among stakeholders of the company, depends 
on their involvement level in audit process and 
their point of view on how they measure audit 
quality. 
For example, investors have their own 
perspective towards audit. Investors want that 
the financial statements they use are useful for 
decision making. To be useful for decision 
making, financial statements should have high 
credibility, so investors measure audit quality 
from the credibility of the financial statements. 
Investors would review the preparer of the 
financial statements and auditor who has given 
an opinion to the financial statements. 
Investors may expect companies audited by 
auditors with good reputation to produce 
credible financial statements. 
The early concept of audit quality is 
traced back to the auditors’ independence. 
According to DeAngelo (1981), auditors’ 
independence is defined as the probability that 
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auditor would find and report misstatements on 
financial statements and would not mind the 
pressure from management to not report the 
misstatement (if there is pressure from 
management). 
Audit quality could also be viewed from 
the perspective of audit failure. Audit failure is 
difficult to describe, nevertheless according to 
Francis (2004) it could be measured from 
various sources, such as litigations to the 
auditor, business failure, examination by the 
stock market authority, and the restatement of 
financial statements. The higher the audit 
quality, the lower the audit failure would be. 
Auditor size may also be employed as a 
measure of audit quality. DeAngelo (1981) 
argues that large public accounting firms 
(PAFs) have better audit quality due to lack of 
dependence on certain clients, so they have 
greater independence. Inspired from that study, 
studies focused on Big 4 PAFs contended that 
Big 4 PAFs have had reputation and incentive 
to provide high quality audit service to 
maintain their reputation (Simunic and Stein 
1987; Francis and Wilson 1988). Becker et al. 
(1998) and Francis et al. (1999) demonstrate 
that companies audited by Big 4 PAFs have 
lower abnormal accruals denoting lower 
earnings management and higher earnings 
quality. 
The Big 4 audit quality, under several 
studies, may arise from higher audit fees and 
special expertise in the industry. Simunic 
(1980) discovers that Big 4 PAFs have higher 
audit fees (fee premium) than other PAFs after 
controlling client characteristics i.e. size, 
complexity, and risk sharing between auditors 
and clients. On average, Big 4 audit fees are 
estimated to be 20% higher than non-Big 4. 
Higher audit fees might improve audit quality 
as greater audit effort, shown by lengthier audit 
working hours or more competent auditor 
(Francis 2004). 
If a PAF has a lot of clients in a particular 
industry, it should have opportunity to enhance 
its ability and gain experience until the PAF 
becomes expert in that industry. Big 4 PAFs 
have plenty clients across industries and 
resources to improve the abilities of their 
auditors, so that the Big 4 is more likely to 
develop an industry expertise compared to 
non-Big 4 PAFs. Balsam et al. (2003) detected 
that clients audited by Big 4 PAFs having 
industry specialization had lower discretionary 
accruals and higher earnings response 
coefficient describing higher earnings quality. 
Audit tenure, or how long a PAF auditing 
a client, may also be used to measure audit 
quality. Theoretically, at the beginning of the 
tenure, audit quality would be low since the 
PAF is still in the process of understanding the 
client’s business. Johnson et al. (2002) found 
the evidence that there was lower audit quality 
in the first three years after auditor switch. 
However, too long tenure may have adverse 
effect on audit quality because relationship 
between the auditor and the client would be 
closer, so that the independence and the 
professional skepticism of the auditor would 
be reduced (Johnson et al. 2002). 
Financial statements users make 
economic decisions based on audited financial 
statements. In consequence, the opinion of the 
company’s ability to continue its business is 
extremely important to financial statements 
users. Going concern opinion, clearly stating 
the auditors’ doubt of the company’s ability to 
continue its business, is a signal that the 
company is facing going concern problems, 
such as financial problems. Therefore, going 
concern opinion could be a measure of audit 
quality. It is considerably necessary for 
auditors to provide accurate going concern 
opinion because according to Francis (2004), 
false positives in going concern opinion 
(company obtaining going concern opinion but 
not going bankrupt) may reduce audit quality. 
The empirical research of Bhimani et al. 
(2009) verified that generally companies 
receiving going concern opinion indeed went 
bankrupt, and the probability that such 
companies going bankrupt is greater than 
companies not receiving going concern 
opinion. 
Lee and Stone (1995) concluded that 
components of auditor quality can be 
summarized as competence (skills, knowledge 
and experience) and independence (lack of 
prejudice). Schandl (1978) and Flint (1988) 
regarded that independence is more important 
to an auditor than competence, but both 
qualities are required for an effective audit. On 
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the other hand, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
stated that the issue of independence and 
competence in the case of auditor reporting a 
contractual breach is conditional on two 
separate probabilities. Moizer (1991) offered 
an alternative to the two views, and suggested 
that competence and independence of an 
auditor is a choice: a competent auditor may 
choose to be dependent or independent. 
Departing from Moizer's (1991) view, Lee and 
Stone (1995) proposed that auditor cannot 
choose to be independent unless he is 
competent. Using case study from several 
court decisions (e.g. Westminster Road 
Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd. (1932, 86 
Acct. L.R. 38) and Thomas Gerrard and Son 
Ltd. (1968, Ch. 455)), they argued that because 
the auditors presented in the cases were not 
competent, they had to depend on evidential 
materials and figures provided by the clients' 
management, and unable to question them in 
an independent manner. 
In the studies mentioned above, it can be 
concluded that audit quality could be measured 
in many dimensions so that it could entirely 
describe audit quality (Bamber and Bamber 
2009; Francis 2004; Watkins et al. 2004).  
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
Effect of Alignment Effect of Controlling 
Shareholders on Audit Quality  
Darmadi (2012) found that concentrated 
shares ownership, measured by the percentage 
of shares owned by the largest shareholders, 
has positive effect on audit quality. While Fan 
and Wong (2002) show that the increasing 
ownership of the controlling shareholders may 
reduce the expropriation ability of the 
controlling shareholders. The increase in 
controlling shareholders’ ownership increases 
the alignment effect, where such increase 
would encourage the controlling shareholders 
to increase the value of the company. 
Based on above argument, the alignment 
effect of the controlling shareholders is 
expected to enhance audit quality.  
H1:  The alignment effect of the controlling 
shareholders positively affects audit 
quality.  
 
Effect of Entrenchment Effect of Controlling 
Shareholders on Audit Quality  
The entrenchment effect of the 
controlling shareholders is the ability of the 
controlling shareholders to direct discretions of 
the company (Claessens et al. 2002). The 
pyramidal ownership mechanism enables the 
controlling shareholders to have control rights 
exceeding cash flow rights. This condition 
encourages expropriation of the company’s 
wealth without bearing any high cost when 
there is loss or decrease in the company’s 
value, because the controlling shareholders 
have low cash flow rights (Claessens et al. 
2002). 
When the expropriation activity is 
detected by external parties, for instance 
investors, investors would discount their 
valuation of the company’s value, which may 
cause the decrease of shares value and the 
increase of cost of capital (Claessens et al. 
2002; Fan and Wong 2005). In such situation, 
the controlling shareholders may be 
encouraged to embezzle their expropriation 
activities so that the external parties could not 
detect them by decreasing the disclosure 
quality of the company’s financial statements 
(Fan and Wong 2002). To help concealing the 
real financial conditions of the company, the 
company may appoint auditor with low audit 
quality (Choi et al. 2007, 2008). 
Based on the above researches, one of 
the probabilities that may arise from the 
entrenchment effect of the controlling 
shareholders is a low audit quality. This low 
audit quality is caused by the desire of the 
controlling shareholders to conceal their 
expropriation activities by reducing the 
transparency of the financial statements and 
this could potentially lower the audit quality. 
However, agency conflict is not always 
negatively associated with audit quality (Fan 
and Wong 2005; El Ghoul et al. 2007). The 
presence of agency conflict may reduce 
company’s value and increase the cost of 
capital, also complicate the controlling 
shareholders to obtain outside funding (El 
Ghoul et al. 2007). In that condition, the 
controlling shareholders would be motivated 
to appoint high-quality external auditor to 
reduce the potential agency conflict caused by 
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the negative entrenchment effect (Fan and 
Wong 2005). Additionally, the appointment of 
high-quality external auditor may also be 
viewed as a signal that the controlling 
shareholders would protect and concern about 
the interests of the non-controlling 
shareholders. Because of the contradicting 
view about the effect of controlling 
shareholders on the audit quality, therefore, the 
next hypothesis can be stated as two-tail 
hypothesis as follows: 
H2: The entrenchment effect of the 
controlling shareholders affects the 
audit quality. 
 
Effect of Board of Commissioners and Audit 
Committee on Audit Quality  
In two-tier corporate governance system, 
the role of the board of commissioners (BOC) 
is to conduct monitoring function to promote 
accountability and transparency of the 
presentation of financial statements (National 
Committee of Indonesia Governance Policies 
2006; Panel 1994 in Abbott and Parker 2000). 
In carrying out their duties, BOC is assisted by 
audit committee. 
According to the Regulation of the 
Bapepam-LK (now known as OJK (Otoritas 
Jasa Keuangan) or Financial Services 
Authority) Number KEP-643/BL/2012, audit 
committee is a committee established and is 
responsible to BOC in assisting them to do 
their duties and responsibilities. The audit 
committee is established by BOC to promote 
accountability and transparency of the 
presentation of the company’s financial 
statements so that the company may mitigate 
risks of reputational and financial loss (Menon 
and Williams 1994). One of the main duties of 
the audit committee according to the 
Regulation of the Bapepam-LK Number KEP-
643/BL/2012 is to give recommendation to 
BOC regarding the appointment of PAF which 
is based on independence, engagement scope 
and fee of the PAF. Therefore, the audit quality 
of a company is greatly influenced by the role 
of BOC and the audit committee. 
Maharani (2012) found that the size of 
the board of commissioners has a positive and 
significant effect to the appointment of 
auditors of great quality. According to OECD 
(2004), the board of commissioners affects the 
monitoring capacity of management’s 
conduct, and minimize information the 
information asymmetry between the 
management and the owners by increasing the 
transparency of financial reporting. Putra et al. 
(2014) found that the independence of the 
board of commissioners affects the choice of 
quality auditors. Lin and Liu (2009) found that 
companies which have large supervisory board 
(the board contains more members) has a 
positive effect to the appointment of Top 10 
auditors. Beasley and Petroni (2001) found that 
the independence of the board is related with 
choosing of auditors who has industry 
specialization. In general, it can be concluded 
that the board of commissioners has a positive 
effect to audit quality. 
The quality of audit committee is also 
considered as an important factor that 
influences audit quality (Fitriany 2011). 
Rustam et al. (2013) found that the activeness 
and independence of the audit committee has a 
significant and positive effect to the audit fees 
as a measure of audit quality. The effectiveness 
of audit committee is also found by Maharani 
(2012) to have a positive and significant effect 
to the appointment of high quality auditor. The 
appointment of high-quality auditor is caused 
by the aspiration of the audit committee to 
conduct their monitoring function of the 
financial statements effectively (Wild 1996; 
Abbott and Parker 2000). It can be concluded 
from the previous research that the audit 
committee also has a positive relationship with 
audit quality. 
According to previous researches above, 
the effective role of the board of 
commissioners and audit committee is 
expected to increase audit quality. Therefore, 
the next hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
H3: The effectiveness of the board of 
commissioners and audit committee 
positively affect the audit quality. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Research Model 
The tests about the alignment and 
entrenchment effect of the controlling 
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shareholders, and the effect of the 
effectiveness of the board of commissioners 
and the audit committee will be conducted 
using a proportional odds model that is 
processed using ordered logistic method. The 
ordered logistic method is used because the 
dependent variable is an ordinal variable. 
The model specification to test 
hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 is as follows: 
 
AUDQUAL1 = β0 + β1CFRit + β2CFLit + 
β3GOVit + β4SIZEit + 
β5LEVit + β6PROFit + εit 
 
where: 
AUDQUAL1 : The level of audit quality 
β0 : Intercept 
β1-6 : Regression coefficients 
CFR : The ratio between the control 
rights and cash flow rights of 
the controlling shareholders 
CFL : The cash flow rights of the 
controlling shareholders 
GOV : The score of the effectiveness 
of the board of commissioners 
and the audit committee 
LEV : Leverage of the company 
SIZE : Size of the company 
PROF : Profitability of the company 
 
Variables Operational Definition 
The definition and measurement of the 
variables in this research can be seen in Table 
1. Explanation of the variables will follow after 
the table. 
 
Table 1 
Variables Operational Definition 
No Variable Definition and Measurement Researcher 
1 Cash flow rights of 
the controlling 
shareholders (CFR) 
The cash flow rights is the addition of the multiplication of the percentage 
of share ownerships for every chain of share ownership. 
Diyanty (2012) 
2 Cash flow leverage 
(CFL) 
Cash flow leverage is the ratio between control rights (CR) and cash flow 
rights (CFR). 
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
 
CRit is the value of control rights is computed using the weakest link of 
the control chain. However, if there is more than one individual in a 
family, their ownership proportion will be combined to one and then the 
weakest link is examined. 
LaPorta et al. 
(1999); Diyanty 
(2012) 
 
LaPorta et al. 
(1999); LaPorta et 
al. (2002); 
Claessens et al. 
(1999b, 2002); 
Claessens et al. 
(2000); Diyanty 
(2012) 
3 The score of the 
effectiveness of the 
board of 
commissioners and 
the audit committee 
(GOV) 
The score is measured using a questionnaire divided to parts that measure 
the effectiveness of the board commissioners (17 questions) and the 
effectiveness of the audit committee (11 questions). Every question can 
have value between 1 and 3, therefore the score of the effectiveness of the 
board of commissioners and audit committee has a minimum score of 28 
((17 x 1) + (11 x 1)) and a maximum score of 84 ((17 x 3) + (11 x 3)).  
Hermawan (2009) 
4 Leverage of the 
company (LEV) 
Leverage is measured by dividing the total of long-term debt to total 
assets. 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
Long-term debtit = long-term debt of company i in year t 
Total assetsit = total assets of company i in year t 
 
Grossman and Hart 
(1982) 
5 Size of the company 
(SIZE) 
The size of the company is measured using the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization of the company in the end of year t. 
Beatty (1993); Fan 
and Wong (2005); 
Ali and Lesage 
(2013) 
6 Profitability of the 
company (PROF) 
Profitability of the company is measured using Return on Assets (ROA). 
The ROA is computed by dividing net income with average of total assets. 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1)/2
 
Net incomeit = net income of company i in year t 
Total assetsit = total assets of company i in year t 
Total assetsit-1 = total assets of company i in year t-1 
Willenborg (1999); 
Chaney et al. 
(2004) 
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7 The level of audit 
quality 
(AUDQUAL1) 
The audit quality in this research is measured using AQMS (Audit Quality 
Metric Score) formulated by Herusetya (2012). AQMS is measured by 
computing the score of 5 measures of audit quality from the perspective 
of auditor competence; that is the size of the PAF (Big 4 or non-Big 4), 
the audit tenure and the auditor industry specialization; and the 
perspective of independence, which is measured by the importance of the 
client to the auditor (client importance) and the availability and the 
accuracy of the going concern audit opinion (a proxy for audit failure). 
The maximum value of every audit quality measures is 1, so that the 
maximum value of audit quality measured by AQMS is 5. 
 
No 
Audit Quality 
Measure 
Description 
1 PAF Size Valued 1 if the PAF is one of the Big 4, and 0 
otherwise. 
2 Industry 
Specialization 
Valued 1 if the PAF has the greatest share in the 
industry and 0 otherwise. The greatest industry 
share is measured with the threshold of highest 
10% of industry share (Craswell et al. 1995). 
The industry share is measured with the ratio:  
 
The total of a PAF clients’ assets in the 
manufacturing industry 
The total assets of all PAF clients’ in the 
manufacturing industry 
 
3 Audit Tenure Valued 1 if the tenure is 3-4 years, and 0 
otherwise4 
4 Client 
Importance 
(CI) 
Measures the economic dependence level of the 
auditor to the client. It is measured with the 
ratio:  
𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 =
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
∑ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where the numerator is the natural logarithm is 
the total assets of client i on year t and the 
denominator is the natural logarithm of the total 
assets of clients audited by PAF i in year t5.  
If CI is valued between 𝜇 ± 𝜎, then this 
variable is valued 1, and 0 otherwise. 
5 The Accuracy 
of Going 
Concern 
Opinion (GC) 
Valued 1 if:  
a. The PAF issued going concern opinion to 
client i on year t and at year t + 1 that client 
i experienced negative cash flows from 
operations or net loss; or  
b. The PAF did not issue a going concern 
opinion to client i on year t and on year t + 
1 that client i did not experience negative 
cash flows or net loss.  
And valued 0 otherwise. 
AQMS Maximum Value = 5 
 
Herusetya (2012) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 According to previous research (Herusetya 2012), auditors will obtain a reasonable understanding of their clients’ 
business and industry when audit tenure is 4-8 years without lowering auditors' independence.  See also Johnson et al. 
(2002), where audit tenure is grouped into 2-3 years (short tenure), 4-8 years (medium tenure), and over 9 years (long 
tenure). However, in this research, a regulation (PMK No. 17 Year 2008) that limits audit tenure to 5 years is in effect. 
Therefore, we find it reasonable that 3-4 years is the 'medium tenure' when the audit tenure is limited to 5 years. 
5 The data for auditor and clients are obtained from PPAJP (Pusat Pembinaan Akuntan dan Jasa Penilai) of the Ministry 
of Finance. After 2014, it is called Pusat Pembinaan Profesi Keuangan/PPPK. The data is then connected to asset data 
from the financial statements of companies. 
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Independent Variables 
 
The Alignment and Entrenchment Effect of 
the Controlling Shareholders 
In this research, the controlling 
ownership of the controlling shareholders is 
measured using two variables, the cash flow 
rights/CFR (for the alignment effect), and the 
ratio between the control rights and cash flow 
rights/CFL (for the entrenchment effect). The 
measuring of variables is based on Diyanty 
(2012) which is a development from LaPorta 
et al. (1999); LaPorta et al. (2002); Claessens 
et al. (1999a, 2000); Claessens et al. (2002) 
which is conducted by tracing to the ultimate 
owners of the company. If the ultimate owners 
amounted to more than one individual in one 
family, the total ownership is the total 
ownership of the family. The data for family 
ownership is obtained from Diyanty (2012) 
from Pusat Data Bisnis Indonesia  
 
Cash Flow Right (CFR) 
This variable describes the cash flow 
rights of the greatest controlling shareholders 
(Diyanty 2012). The cash flow rights is the 
addition of the multiplication of the percentage 
of share ownerships for every chain of share 
ownership. 
 
Control Rights (CR) 
The value of control rights is computed 
using the weakest link of the control chain 
(LaPorta et al. 1999; LaPorta et al. 2002; 
Claessens et al. 1999b, 2002; Claessens et al. 
2000). However, if there is more than one 
individual in a family, their ownership 
proportion will be combined to one and then 
the weakest link is examined (based on 
Diyanty’s (2012) method).  
 
Cash Flow Leverage (Ratio between Control 
Rights and Cash Flow Rights/CFL) 
According to LaPorta et al. (1999), the 
high ratio between the control rights and cash 
flow rights happened when the controlling 
shareholders reduced their ownership through 
superior voting rights through a pyramidal 
structure or cross-ownership. Cash flow 
leverage is a ratio that measures the incentive 
of expropriation of the controlling 
shareholders and the entrenchment effect of 
the controlling shareholders (Diyanty 2012).  
 
The Role of the Board of Commissioners and 
Audit Committee (GOV) 
The role of the board of commissioners 
and audit committee (GOV) is measured with 
an index developed by Hermawan (2009) 
related to the size, independence, competence, 
and the activity of the board of commissioners 
and the audit committee. This index is divided 
to parts that measure the effectiveness of the 
board commissioners (17 questions) and the 
effectiveness of the audit committee (11 
questions). Every question can have value 
between 1 and 3, therefore the score of the 
effectiveness of the board of commissioners 
and audit committee has a minimum score of 
28 ((17 x 1) + (11 x 1)) and a maximum score 
of 84 ((17 x 3) + (11 x 3)). The data for the 
index is obtained from the Annual Report of 
the companies.  
 
Control Variables 
 
Company’s Size (SIZE) 
Previous studies found that the 
appointment of PAFs tend to have a positive 
relationship with the size and business 
complexity of the company (Beatty 1993; Fan 
and Wong 2005). The size of the company is 
measured using the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization of the company in the 
end of year t.  
 
Company’s Profitability (PROF) 
Willenborg (1999) found that companies 
audited by big-scale auditors have higher 
profitability, ceteris paribus. Companies that 
have higher profitability also tend to appoint 
auditors with bigger scale (that exhibit higher 
audit quality) (Chaney et al. 2004). 
Profitability of the company is measured using 
Return on Assets (ROA). The ROA is 
computed by dividing net income with average 
of total assets. 
 
Company’s Leverage (LEV) 
Companies with greater leverage tend to 
have higher bankruptcy risk or financial 
failures (Grossman and Hart 1982). According 
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to Grossman and Hart (1982) also, in that 
situation, companies tend to appoint a better-
quality auditor to avoid the decrease in the 
company’s value. Leverage is measured by 
dividing the total of long-term debt to total 
assets. 
  
Dependent Variables 
 
Audit Quality 
According to the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) Regulation No. 17 Year 2008, a 
company should rotate PAFs every 6 book 
years and PAF partner every 3 years. A change 
of 50% or more of the partner's name counts as 
a change in PAF. Fitriany (2011) found that 
many non-Big 4 PAFs merged themselves to 
circumvent the rotation requirements, where 
the operational of the PAF still rested within 
the previous PAFs and only the name 
changed.6 
To address this issue, Fitriany (2011) 
divided the rotation of PAFs into real and 
pseudo rotation, therefore in this research 
tenure is also divided into real and pseudo 
tenure. Pseudo tenure is defined as tenure 
measured to five years before the audit 
engagement in the research period (if the 
information is available), whether there is a 
partner change in the PAF in the five years 
period before the audit engagement. The real 
tenure is measured without regarding the 
change of partners. If the PAF still has the 
same affiliation, it will be counted as one PAF. 
As an illustration, Company A is audited 
by PAF Purwantono, Sarwoko, and Sandjaja 
affiliated to Ernst and Young (EY) for the 
period 2004-2007. For the period of 2008 to 
2010, the company is audited by PAF 
Purwantono, Suherman and Surja affiliated to 
EY. If measured using pseudo tenure, at the 
end of year 2008, the tenure of the PAF is 1 
years (because it is currently audited by PAF 
Purwantono, Suherman, and Surja). However, 
if measured using real tenure, Company A has 
been audited by the PAF for 5 years, because 
the PAF is still affiliated with EY for 5 years 
                                                          
6 This has changed since the enactment of Indonesia 
Government Regulation No. 20/2015 that stated that 
PAF partner is limited to 5 (five) consecutive book 
years. 
before 2008, so that it is counted as one PAF. 
The time limit of 5 years is used because the 
data for PAF tenure from the PPAJP is 
obtained from 2004. 
Fitriany (2011) found that in the period 
after the enactment of the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) Regulation) No. 17 Year 2008, the 
rotation of PAF partner increased the audit 
quality from the perspective of neutrality and 
predictability. Fitriany (2011) also found that 
in that period the audit quality from the 
perspective of neutrality has a convex-shaped 
relationship with the audit tenure and from the 
perspective of predictability has a linear 
negative relationship. In this research, we use 
sample from 2008-2012, and according to 
MOF Regulation No. 17 Year 2008, the 
rotation of PAF partner must be conducted 
every 3 years7. Based on the research and the 
regulation, this research uses 3-4 years as 
tenure that is considered “good” because every 
3 years there must be a rotation in the PAF 
partner, but the audit quality will deteriorate 
when the tenure is too long. Therefore, tenure 
is considered good if it lasts for 3 to 4 years. 
The data for modified AQMS variable is 
obtained from the financial statements of the 
companies, Indonesia Capital Market 
Directory, and the Pusat Data Bisnis Indonesia 
(PDBI). 
 
Population and Sample 
This research uses secondary data from 
manufacturing companies listed in the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2008 to 
2012. Manufacturing sector is the sector with 
the most companies in IDX, so we expect it to 
be representative to the whole market. We also 
consider the time and cost needed to trace the 
ultimate owners and calculate the audit quality. 
The data is obtained from Annual Reports of 
companies from the IDX and Data stream 
Thomson Reuters and the tracing of ownership 
structure is obtained from the Ministry of Law 
and Human Rights of the Republic of 
Indonesia. The data about PAF is obtained 
from the Pusat Pembinaan Akuntan dan Jasa 
7 Indonesia Government Regulation No. 20/2015 has 
lifted the restriction that PAFs have to be rotated every 
5 years. However, when this study is conducted (2014), 
the MoF Regulation No. 17 Year 2008 is still in effect. 
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Penilai of the Ministry of Finance of the 
Republic of Indonesia (PPAJP). 
The population in this research is all 
companies listed in the IDX from 2008 to 
2012. The samples are chosen using purposive 
sampling, a sample choosing method 
according to certain criteria, that is: 
manufacturing companies listed in the IDX 
from December 31, 2008 until December 31, 
2012 (that never delisted, suspended, or went 
private), companies whose share ownership 
can be traced to the ultimate shareholders and 
the entrenchment effect can be measured, 
companies with positive equity8, companies 
that are not Foreign But Indonesian 
(FOBINDO)9, and companies that have all 
components that is required to measure the 
variables used in this research. According to 
those criteria, the samples used in this research 
are 432 companies for 5 years (2008 until 
2012). 
 
Table 2 
Sample Breakdown 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Initial sample 133 131 133 139 138 
FOBINDO companies (16) (11) (9) (8) (10) 
Companies with negative equity (11) (10) (9) (8) (8) 
Companies delisted in the current year (3) (5) 0 (2) (1) 
Financial statements not found (10) (18) (4) 0 (2) 
Audit opinion not found10 (5) (5) (5) (4) (2) 
Incomplete data for other variables (23) (9) (11) (18) (21) 
Total sample per year 65 73 95 99 99 
Total sample from 2008-2012 432 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the data is 
shown on Table 3. From Table 3, it can be seen 
that the audit quality has the average of 2.8866. 
This value shows that on average, the audit 
                                                          
8 Companies with negative equity generally experienced 
cumulative loss continually and tend to use debts to 
finance their operations. This condition can affect the 
basic assumption of the creation of the company’s 
financial statement, the going concern assumption 
(IFRS conceptual framework).  
9 FOBINDO are companies that when established were 
owned by families, but then changed ownership to 
foreign companies in the next years, with control still 
maintained in the establishing family (Kim 2003 in 
Diyanty 2012). FOBINDO is identified by Diyanty 
(2012) that was collected from Pusat Data Bisnis 
Indonesia (PDBI). For example, Diyanty (2012) gave 
example of Indoofod that, before the 1997-1998 
Indonesian economic crisis, was owned by Salim group. 
In 1999, Indofood was acquired by First Pacific and 
Nissin (foreign direct investment companies).  
However, First Pacific, which is situated in Hong Kong, 
quality is moderate (from the max score 5). 
The descriptive statistics shows that CFL on 
average has a value above 1, which means that 
in most companies, the controlling 
shareholders have control rights exceeding 
their cash flow rights. The effectiveness of the 
board of commissioners and audit committee 
is actually owned by the Salim group (Kompas, January 
26, 1999 in Diyanty 2012). Diyanty (2012) suspects that 
the previous Indonesian company controllers may have 
purchased shares using foreign companies to control the 
companies they previously owned. We determine if 
companies are still controlled by the same owners after 
1999, even if the name of the controllers change, based 
on the information from PDBI. If there is a change in 
controllers of a company, but it is still actually owned 
by the previous owners, it will be identified as 
FOBINDO and excluded from our sample. 
10 This condition is distinct from “financial statements 
not found”. In some cases, the financial statements is 
found, but the page containing the audit opinion is not 
found, or financial informations are found from other 
sources such as Indonesia Capital Market Directory, but 
the financial statements itself is not found. 
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has an average score of 0.68 (maximum value 
of 1). It is consistent with World Bank (2010) 
that states that there are some weaknesses in 
the board of commissioners and audit 
committee in the monitoring function in 
Indonesia.
 
Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std.  Deviation 
AUDQUAL1 0.0000 5.0000 2.8866 1.2884 
CFR 0.0629 0.9974 0.5192 0.2327 
CFL 1.000 2.3233 1.1259 0.2984 
GOV 0.3810 0.9167 0.6751 0.1212 
PROF -0.2524 0.4070 0.0770 0.1060 
SIZE 20.7869 33.5836 27.4410 2.2127 
LEVERAGE 0.0000 0.5456 0.1042 0.1389 
 
Regression Results 
 
The Influence of the Alignment Effect of the 
Controlling Shareholders to Audit Quality 
The aim of this research is to test the 
influence of the alignment effect of the 
controlling shareholders and the effectiveness 
of the board of commissioners and audit 
committee to the audit quality. The result of the 
hypothesis testing can be found in Table 4. 
Based on Table 4, the result shows that if 
CFR increases, the company tends to choose a 
higher quality auditor. This result supports the 
results of the researches of Darmadi (2012) and 
Hay et al. (2008). A high alignment effect 
causes the controlling shareholders to have a 
low motivation to expropriate the non-
controlling shareholders (Diyanty 2012). 
Diyanty (2012) also stated the increase of the 
share ownership will increase the alignment of 
the interest of the controlling and the non-
controlling shareholders. The alignment of 
interest between the controlling and the non-
controlling shareholders is the factor that 
encouraged the company to appoint a high-
quality auditor. 
According to Table 4, the result of CFL 
variable showed that the probability of higher 
quality audit level compared to lower audit 
quality level will increase by 2.2898 times if 
the CFL increases by 1 time. This result 
implies that as the entrenchment effect of the 
controlling shareholders is stronger, the 
company tends to choose a high-quality 
auditor. 
The finding of the entrenchment effect in 
this research supports the result of Fan and 
Wong (2005) that stated that the controlling 
shareholders will choose a high-quality auditor 
to give a signal to the non-controlling 
shareholders that they care for the interests of 
the non-controlling shareholders. 
Additionally, the controlling shareholders 
wanted to maintain the reputation of their 
company by appointing a high-quality auditor 
(El Ghoul et al. 2007). 
The effectiveness of BOC and Audit 
Committee or GOV gives result as predicted, 
with a positive and significant coefficient 
(alpha 1%). This result shows that BOC and 
Audit Committee have a positive and 
significant effect to the quality of auditor 
appointed by the company. The odds ratio 
value of 6.3240 shows that in every 1-point 
increase of GOV, the probability of audit 
quality that is higher compared to lower audit 
quality will increase by 6.3240 times. The 
existence of an effective BOC and audit 
committee is able to strengthen the motivation 
for controlling shareholder to appoint a public 
accounting firm with higher audit quality. 
This result is consistent with Lin and Liu 
(2009) that found that the size of the 
supervisory board (the board of 
commissioners) has a positive effect in the 
appointment of Top 10 auditor, and Beasley 
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and Petroni (2001) that found that the 
independence of the board is associated with 
the appointment of a higher quality auditor. 
The result of this research is also in line with 
the findings of Rustam et al. (2013) that the 
activity and the independence of the audit 
committee have a positive and significant 
relationship on audit quality. 
The significant result of PROF variable 
shows that the probability of a higher quality 
audit compared to a lower quality audit will 
increase by 8.6467 times with 1-point increase 
in PROF. The interpretation of the odds ratio 
for the SIZE variable is that in every 1-point 
increase in SIZE, the probability of a higher 
quality audit compared to a lower quality audit 
will increase by e1,2989 or 3.6653 times. These 
findings are consistent with Beatty (1993), Fan 
and Wong (2005), and Lennox (2005).
 
Table 4 
 Result of Ordered Logistic of Model 1 
Variables Coefficient Odds Ratio Sig Description 
CFR 0.7974 22.197 0.0290* significant 
CFL 0.8284 22.898 0.0110* significant 
GOV 18.444 63.240 0.0060* significant 
PROF 21.572 86.467 0.0165* significant 
SIZE 0.2615 12.989 0.0000* significant 
LEVERAGE -0.2913 0.7473 0.3390 insignificant 
_cut111 56.670 56.670   
_cut2 80.043 80.043   
_cut3 95.667 95.667   
_cut4 104.741 104.741   
_cut5 123.032 123.032     
Pseudo R2 = 0.0548       
LR chi2(6)          = 76.16    
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000       
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
To prove that the research model will 
give a consistent result if the proxy of the 
variable is changed, a sensitivity analysis is 
conducted. The sensitivity analysis conducted 
in this research is to change the tenure in the 
AQMS to a real tenure (so that the variable 
AUDQUAL1 becomes AUDQUAL2). This 
change in tenure is conducted because there is 
a probability that the rotation of the PAF done 
by the companies is not a real but rather only a 
pseudo rotation (Fitriany 2011). 
In this sensitivity analysis, like the main 
analysis, a test about the alignment and 
entrenchment effect of the controlling 
                                                          
11 In an ordered logistic regression, Stata determines constant to be 0, and estimate cutpoints (threshold) to separate 
levels of the response (Y) variable. _cut is the intercept of the Y variable when X = 0. For example, _cut1 is the area 
where Y = 0, _cut2 is the area where 0 < Y ≤ 1, _cut3 is the area where 1 < Y ≤ 2, and so on. 
shareholders are also conducted. The aim is to 
find out if the change in tenure in AQMS gives 
a robust result. 
From the result, it can be seen that the 
coefficient of CFR is positive and significant. 
This result is consistent with the main analysis. 
It can be concluded that if CFR increases, the 
company will tend to appoint a higher quality 
auditor. The high alignment effect of the 
controlling shareholders results in the low 
motivation of the controlling shareholders to 
conduct expropriation (Diyanty 2012). The 
presence of alignment of interest between the 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders 
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becomes a motivation for the company to 
appoint a high-quality auditor.  
The CFL variable is significant, and this 
result is consistent and supportive of the main 
analysis. This result implies that if the 
entrenchment effect of the controlling 
shareholders is stronger, the company will tend 
to choose a higher quality auditor.  
 
Table 5 
Sensitivity Analysis of Changing AUDQUAL1 to AUDQUAL2 
Variables Coefficient Odds Ratio Sig Description 
CFR 10.688 28.838 0.0060* significant 
CFL 0.8733 23.829 0.0060* significant 
GOV 20.718 75.859 0.0025* significant 
PROF 21.498 83.596 0.0190* significant 
SIZE 0.2491 12.834 0.0000* significant 
LEVERAGE -0.2764 38.675 0.3500 insignificant 
_cut1 57.911 57.911   
_cut2 78.443 78.443   
_cut3 96.789 96.789   
_cut4 106.698 106.698   
_cut5 133.941 133.941     
Pseudo R2 = 0.0570    
LR chi2(6)          = 74.26    
Prob >Chi2 = 0.0000       
The finding about entrenchment effect in 
this research supports the research of Fan and 
Wong (2005) that stated that controlling 
shareholders will choose a high-quality auditor 
to give signal to the non-controlling 
shareholders that they care about the interests 
of the non-controlling shareholders. According 
to El Ghoul et al. (2007), the controlling 
shareholders also tend to appoint high quality 
auditors to maintain the reputation of their 
company and to avoid litigations. 
The effectiveness of BOC and Audit 
Committee or GOV also shows a positive and 
significant effect to the quality of auditor 
appointed by the company. Every result of this 
sensitivity analysis supports the main analysis. 
The conclusion is that the sensitivity analysis 
in this research gives a robust result.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
The alignment effect of the controlling 
shareholders has a positive effect to audit 
quality. The alignment effect increases the 
alignment of interests between the controlling 
and non-controlling shareholders (Diyanty 
2012). The alignment of interests between the 
controlling and no controlling shareholders 
caused the company to appoint a high-quality 
auditor. 
The entrenchment effect of the 
controlling shareholders turns out to have a 
positive effect to the audit quality. The high 
audit quality when the entrenchment effect of 
the controlling shareholder exists comes from 
the desire of the controlling shareholders to 
reduce the agency conflict by appointing a 
high-quality auditor (Fan and Wong 2005). 
The company may also appoint a high-quality 
auditor to maintain the reputation of the 
company (El Ghoul et al. 2007). 
The effectiveness of BOC and Audit 
Committee also has a positive effect to the 
quality of auditors appointed. Increasing the 
effectiveness of BOC and the audit committee 
give evidence will increase the motivation of 
firm to select a public accounting firm with 
higher audit quality.  
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The sensitivity analysis by changing the 
pseudo tenure to real tenure based on Fitriany 
(2011) that after the enactment of the 
regulation of the PAF rotation, there are PAFs 
that rotated their partners and even merger with 
each other, so that the PAF looked as if it 
changed, when in reality the operational was 
still conducted by the previous PAF. This 
sensitivity testing shows that the use of real 
tenure is consistent with the main testing, both 
from the direction of the relationship and the 
significance of effect. The result of the 
sensitivity analysis shows that this result of this 
research is robust to the changing of tenure in 
AQMS from pseudo tenure to real tenure.  
Implications of this research are: 1) 
Previous research only measured audit quality 
based on single-quality dimensions, such as 
PAF size and audit fee, so for the next research, 
the measure of audit quality in this research 
can be applied. A comprehensive measure of 
audit quality that considers competence and 
independence component is needed because 
audit quality cannot be measured by single 
measure; 2) This research shows that 
alignment and positive entrenchment effect 
impacts companies to choose a qualified 
auditor. This is because companies with family 
ultimate controllers want to protect their 
reputation by choosing high-quality external 
auditors. The Government should ensure to 
improve regulations to improve the auditor 
quality. For example, improving regulations to 
maintain the independence of external auditors 
and the external auditors’ competence; and 3) 
The government should enact a regulation to 
improve the effectiveness of BOC and audit 
committee to ensure that the role BOC and 
audit committee to maintain the quality of 
external auditors. 
This research has several limitations: 1) 
This research measures audit quality using 
AQMS developed by Herusetya (2012). This 
AQMS variable is only an addition of its 
composing variables, so there is a possibility 
that it is not yet representative of the real audit 
quality; and 2) The data of ownership in this 
research is limited to the companies whose 
data are available in the Ministry of Law and 
Human Rights. Foreign companies’ data are 
unavailable in the Ministry of Law and Human 
Rights so that their ownership is unknown. 
For future research, audit quality can be 
measured using better proxy from the previous 
proxies, for example, by creating a weighting 
for audit quality measures. We concur that 
competence component should weigh higher 
than independence components. Competence 
is important to ensure that audit opinions are 
accurate. Independence is also important, 
because if independence is low it may lead to 
the collusion of auditor and management to 
manipulate financial statements, as evidenced 
in Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco cases. As 
stated by Lee and Stone (1995), however, we 
believe that auditor competence should 
precede independence. We suggest the weight, 
with the rank as follows: 1) auditor 
competence (industry specialization and the 
accuracy of going concern opinions); 2) 
auditor independence (tenure); and 3) auditor 
size (Big 4 or non-Big 4, and client importance 
to the auditor).  
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